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The ability of low-income countries to productively absorb large amounts of external 
assistance is a central issue for efforts to scale-up aid. This paper examines absorptive 
capacity in the context of MDG-based development programmes in low-income countries. 
It first defines absorptive capacity, and proposes a framework for measuring it. Applying a 
dynamic computable general equilibrium model to link the macro framework to sector 
results, the paper simulates MDG scenarios for Ethiopia and examines the role of 
infrastructure, skilled labour, macroeconomic, and other constraints on absorptive capacity. 
The main policy conclusions are that careful sequencing of public investment across 
sectors is key to minimizing the costs of reaching the MDGs; the macro impact of large aid 
flows on the tradeables sector can potentially be serious in the short run; large-scale 
frontloading of aid disbursements can be costly as it pushes against absorptive constraints; 
and that improvement of governance and institutional structures can significantly reduce 
the cost of achieving the MDGs. 
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1 Introduction 
The recent discussion about the need to scale-up Official Development Assistance in order 
to make significant progress towards the MDGs has highlighted the concept of ‘absorptive 
capacity’. On one side are advocates of a general scaling up who rely on calculations of the 
amount of additional annual aid per capita needed in the next ten years to reach the MDGs. 
On the other side are advocates of ‘aid effectiveness’ cautioning against too much aid 
being delivered beyond the actual ‘absorptive capacity’ of a country. Absorptive capacity 
refers loosely to the ability to use additional aid without pronounced inefficiency of public 
spending and without induced adverse effects, for instance the ‘Dutch disease’, or the 
crowding out of domestic saving.1  
 
In 2005 a decision was taken by the international development community to scale-up aid, 
the objective being to roughly double the volume of development assistance to Africa by 
2010, and increase aid to other countries by around US$25 billion annually. This is an 
important and overdue decision, but it has not made the issue of ‘absorptive capacity’ less 
relevant. Should this aid materialize as promised, care will need to be taken to ensure that 
it is properly used by recipient countries in order to maximize its efficient use towards 
attaining the MDGs. This will require managing additional aid financed public spending 
and addressing absorptive capacity at a given point of time and, at the same time, ensuring 
that this absorptive capacity progressively strengthens to be commensurate with available 
aid flows in order to reach the MDGs. Absorptive capacity has indeed much to do with the 
timing and sequencing of ODA disbursements. Rapid scaling up of assistance in a country 
with very limited capacity to train and hire skilled labour, build new infrastructure, or 
manage large-scale public programmes may result in bottlenecks that result in rising unit 
costs, and falling quality of service delivery. In extreme cases it could conceivably lead to 
impaired growth potential with adverse medium-term consequences, for example if 
country competitiveness is undermined or public revenue efforts are adversely impacted. 
 
To date, there has been very little systematic effort either to define the key drivers of 
absorptive capacity or to measure country ability to absorb scaled up foreign assistance. 
Empirical assessment must be country-specific since countries differ widely in their 
structural and institutional characteristics, and because absorptive capacity is essentially a 
dynamic concept that depends on the entire time path of an economy. Binding limitations 
today may be addressed over time through appropriate planning and investment strategies. 
                                                 
1 The major publications in 2005 on scaling up all have some discussion of absorptive capacity, including the 
Commission for Africa Report ‘Our Common Interest’; the Global Monitoring Report 2005 ‘The Millennium 
Development Goals: From Consensus to Momentum’; the Millennium Project Report, ‘Investing in 
Development’, and the UN report ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights 
For All’. The September 2005 edition of the IMF publication, Finance & Development, included several 
articles relevant to this debate on ‘Making Aid Work’. de Renzio (2005) summarizes the issues surrounding 
scaling up and absorption.   2
In some instances the constraints to absorptive capacity may indeed be quite limiting, and 
indicate that a credible programme to fully reach the MDGs by 2015 is unlikely. This is 
particularly true in unstable or fragile stages, and indicates that alternative delivery tools 
may be needed, and that more modest targets are to be envisaged. In other countries, given 
an adequate strategic framework and sufficient external assistance, absorptive capacity 
may not be a barrier to rapid scaling up of assistance.  
 
This paper addresses absorptive capacity in low-income countries from both a theoretical 
and empirical perspective. It first seeks to clarify what is meant in economic terms by ‘aid 
effectiveness’ and ‘absorptive capacity’, arguing that there are several potentially binding 
constraints to absorptive capacity that pose risks in any economy at any point of time for 
scaling assistance up too rapidly. The paper then briefly presents a framework for 
undertaking country specific analysis and taking explicitly into account absorptive 
capacity. This framework relates the macroeconomic environment and economic growth 
on the one hand, and sector-specific micro-constraints affecting implementation of the 
social MDGs on the other. It presents the rudimentary elements of the modelling 
framework used here to examine absorptive capacity and illustrates the framework with a 
simple application to the case of Ethiopia. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of 
the main findings and implications for designing MDG-based assistance strategies 
consistent with absorptive capacity and its dynamics. 
2  Definition and role of absorptive capacity 
Concern is often raised about the ability of low-income countries to absorb large amounts 
of aid due to insufficient structural and institutional capacity. The literature on aid and 
growth usually considers that a country has reached its absorptive capacity limit for 
foreign aid when the rate of return on further increments of aid falls to some minimum 
acceptable level (for example, see Radelet 2003: 136).2 There is ample evidence that many 
low-income countries suffer from capacity constraints and that the potential benefits from 
additional aid may often be constrained by weak capacity, frequently failing to meet 
intended objectives. Several empirical cross-country studies (Collier and Dollar 2002; 
Hansen and Tarp 2001; Radelet et al. 2004) show that after a certain level additional aid to 
GDP has little effect on growth. This ‘saturation point’ is a function of different proxies for 
absorptive capacity arising from macroeconomic, institutional, infrastructure, human 
capital, or sociocultural constraints (World Bank 2004). There has been an extensive 
literature in particular on the policy environment, which has emphasized that countries 
with ‘good policies and institutions’ can absorb larger amounts of aid before diminishing 
                                                 
2 The literature on aid effectiveness discusses two types of complications that can arise if flows of foreign aid 
are large: macroeconomic and structural complications. Whereas in the case of macroeconomic problems, it is 
the quantity of aid and its allocation between the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors that matter, in the case of 
absorptive capacity, the issue is the quality of spending. See the detailed discussion in World Bank (2002).   3
returns set in.3 In countries with low capacity the saturation point arrives much sooner, and 
additional amounts of aid are unlikely to be very productive.  
 
This conclusion is intuitive and appealing, even though it is derived from cross-country 
analysis which is of little help when examining the case of a particular country. Moreover, 
the literature is not very clear on the causes of the complex phenomenon of declining 
returns. In effect, there is little insight in the literature provided from country-specific 
examples of capacity constraints and when or how they inhibit absorptive capacity and aid 
effectiveness. To clarify concepts, it is helpful to distinguish between these broad factors 
affecting aid effectiveness over time, and absorptive capacity at a given point in time. 
Figure 1 helps define formally the related concepts of aid effectiveness and that of 
absorptive capacity. ‘Aid effectiveness’ refers to the total economic and social return to aid 
at a given point in time. 
 
Figure 1: Aid effectiveness and absorptive capacity  
 
 












The return to aid has many dimensions. In Figure 1 it is associated with the rate of growth 
of GDP. But other dimensions, for instance poverty, the various other MDGs, or even 
summary measures of the welfare effects of aid, could have been used. This return will 
vary depending on several initial conditions—institutions, endowments, policy 
environment, etc.—working in isolation or together. It is an increasing function of the 
                                                 
3 For discussions of this perspective on aid effectiveness, see World Bank (2004), Heller and Gupta (2002a) 
and Goldin et al. (2002). Recent papers that take issue with the result that effectiveness depends on policy and 
institutional quality include Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Easterly et al. (2003). The link between country 
conditions and aid effectiveness is borne out by case studies of individual countries, as well as evidence on 
project-level returns (for example, see the studies in Devarajan et al. 2001). The importance of institutional 
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amount of aid that is made available. Aid effectiveness is the height of this ‘return to aid’ 
curve. It represents ‘what aid can buy’ in the recipient economy at a given level of aid and 
given existing physical and institutional constraints. ‘Absorptive capacity’ refers to the 
marginal rate of return to aid, which is reasonably taken to decline as the amount of aid 
increases.4 At a given point in time, the physical capacity of the economy to produce new 
infrastructure is limited. At some stage, providing more aid to expand infrastructure will 
result in less and less new infrastructure being installed and more and more distortions in 
the economy coming from the increase in aggregate demand. Absorptive capacity sets 
limits on the productive potential of aid, and as constraints become binding the returns to 
additional aid falls—or in other words, the unit cost of additional public goods and 
services, will rise. This distinction between aid effectiveness and absorption capacity is 
depicted in Figure 1. Aid effectiveness can be characterized as the difference between the 
top and bottom curves, representing the return to aid in two different countries. Country 2 
is able to utilize aid more effectively than Country 1 at any given level of aid (relative to 
the size of its economy) due to a combination of endowments, institutions and policies.  
 
‘Capacity’ on the other hand, refers to the declining return to aid in each country as the 
total amount of aid is increased, that is the slope of the return to aid curve. As constraints 
on capacity become binding—skilled labour costs rise, physical infrastructure cannot meet 
demands, administration is overwhelmed—the incremental returns to aid fall. The limit of 
absorptive capacity is reached when the marginal rate of return falls below some minimal 
acceptable level. This may be at point such as B, where a relatively low rate of return is 
still considered acceptable, or it may be at a point like A, representing a higher positive 
marginal rate of return relative to some opportunity cost of funds. In countries with lower 
overall aid effectiveness, such as Country 1, the total returns to aid will be lower. However, 
the absorptive capacity—the marginal return for a given aid/GDP ratio given by the slope 
of the curve—may be higher or lower than in the country with higher aid effectiveness. 
The two curves showing the total returns to aid can also be thought of as the same country 
at two points in time. This underscores the fact that aid effectiveness and absorptive 
capacity are dynamic processes linked to the underlying forces of economic development 
and change over time. Development targets which today are difficult to reach at any level 
of aid due to absorptive capacity constraints, may be possible to reach over time as 
capacity is built and the returns to aid increase.   
 
The adoption of international development goals, the MDGs, affects the debate over 
intertemporal aid allocation in some basic ways. First, the MDGs are targets that have been 
adopted for all low-income countries, with differing levels of aid effectiveness. Allocating 
aid to only those countries with the highest level of aid effectiveness may help to meet 
                                                 
4 In other words, the aid effectiveness curve is taken to be concave. Note that it is not necessarily increasing 
everywhere, though. Some authors assume that increasing aid beyond some limit may be detrimental to the 
recipient economy at some stage. See for instance Hansen and Tarp (2001).    5
global targets, but would not advance the MDG cause in countries with lower aid 
effectiveness and deeper development challenges. Second, the MDG targets are clearly 
defined by their end-point in 2015. This concretely raises the question of how to optimally 
allocate resources to reach these targets over the coming decade.   
 
Several potential constraints to expanding service delivery and accelerating growth help 
determine the shape of the returns to aid curve—both its position and its shape. There are 
three broad categories: quantitative, macroeconomic, and institutional: 
•  Quantitative constraints refer to key inputs to production of the MDGs, such as 
skilled workers (teachers, healthcare workers), required for delivery of core MDG-
related services. Scarcity of physical capital and infrastructure (schools, roads, 
power, etc.) are also important factors in this category. 
•  Macroeconomic constraints refer to the effects of aid flows on the economy—when 
they are fully absorbed and spent. In particular, too much aid inflow is likely to 
distort domestic prices, in favour of non-tradable goods, assuming a limited capacity 
of that sector to respond to increased demand. This is turn reduces the purchasing 
power of aid in terms of domestic goods and crowds out domestic resources from 
their initial use. It may also lower the competitiveness of the economy on foreign 
markets. Of course, central banks may try to mitigate these effects. Also, public 
investment may be used to unlock productivity growth and may neutralize adverse 
effects of aid on competitiveness. But this can only be done progressively, and 
absorptive capacity will be increase only after some time. 
•  Institutional constraints refer to the governance environment broadly, both in terms 
of narrow resource management capacities (budget management,  accounting, 
procurement, etc.), checks and balances institutions affecting the overall investment 
climate (regulatory, judicial, legislative), and the quality of service delivery to 
frontline users. The institutional and governance environment determines the extent 
to which resource leakage and corruption divert resources as aid is scaled up. 
3  A general framework for measuring absorptive capacity  
Identifying the constraints for scaling up aid with a view at reaching the MDGs is complex 
and requires an analytic framework that can capture the main macroeconomic and 
microeconomic aspects surrounding attainment of the MDGs. This framework must be 
dynamic so as to take into account possible changes in absorptive capacity, and in 
particular the effects of public investment and capacity building, the financial and non-
financial requirements to reach the MDGs, and the whole path of public services and 
outcomes consistent with these goals. There presumably are many different time paths that 
lead to the MDGs at a given time horizon. Comparing them is crucial to determine the least 
cost in terms of both domestic and foreign resources to reach that goal. This requires in 
particular considering relevant opportunity costs of all domestic resources being used and 
policies being implemented. In standard project cost-benefit analysis this is relatively   6
straight forward, but in the case of economy-wide interventions with multiple objectives, 
there are several complications that make measurement difficult.  
 
One such issue is the cross effects of investment in one MDG-related activity on the whole 
economy and other MDG outcomes. For instance, investment in water and sanitation 
(MDG8) can quickly improve health outcomes; investment in school and toilet facilities 
for girls and training female staff can improve gender balance and primary completion 
rates; improved roads and connectivity will reduce unit costs of supplying other public 
services, particularly to remote regions.5 Identifying an optimal path will therefore depend 
on identifying these cross-effects and ensuring appropriate sequencing of investments. 
Another consideration is constraints from the demand side. If demand for public services is 
weak, due to poor quality services, uncertainty over returns, sociocultural factors (such as a 
gender bias against girls), or costly tradeoffs (such as the opportunity costs of education 
which arise from forgone child incomes), then there will be limits on public service uptake. 
 
Comparing different paths leading to the MDGs over time requires some common measure 
of the benefits generated. There is no clear way to measure social welfare in the context of 
the MDGs. This would require aggregating across the different MDG targets (primary 
completion, maternal health, access to sanitation, poverty incidence, etc.) whereas an 
important feature of the MDGs is precisely the non-substitution view behind such a multi-
dimensional objective. It is not clear how to compare one path with, for example, better 
education outcomes at the beginning of the period under analysis but worse sanitation 
outcomes with its converse, nor what appropriate discount rates should apply to social 
returns.  
 
Approaching these complex issues requires a framework which incorporates the major 
productive assets in the economy, production processes both in the private and public 
sector, and policy instruments. Figure 2 illustrates the general architecture of such an 
integrated approach. The schema of interconnected boxes shows the core elements that 
need to be integrated conceptually and analytically. Starting from the left of Figure 2, the 
key factors that determine the state of the economy during a unit period and are inherited 
from the past are identified: (i). physical assets, not only plants and equipment, but MDG 
capital—schools, clinics, etc.; (ii) human assets, including labour by skills, possibly in 
specific occupations—nurses, doctors, etc.; (iii) environmental assets including clean water 
and sanitation (MDG7); (iv) governance assets, including institutions, and accountability 
mechanisms relevant to the efficiency of service delivery; and finally (v) intermediate 
inputs.  
 
                                                 
5 Recent research in Nepal suggests that spending on agricultural research and extension, followed by rural 
roads, can have the greatest marginal impact on poverty reduction (Fan et al. 2004)   7
The middle boxes in Figure 2 represent the general equilibrium of the economy during the 
current period. The outcome of economic activity is represented by levels of output (GDP) 
including in the public sector, and the distribution of income within the population. These 
outcomes jointly determine results on the MDG front, both for income MDG (i.e. poverty) 
and non-income goals. Of course the equilibrium of the economy is also governed by the 
macroeconomic framework and by public policies, which are shown on the right side, and 
represent the key policy space that influences outcomes on the MDG and non-MDG fronts. 
At the same time policies and the equilibrium of the economy determine the changes 
taking place in the various assets, appearing on the left-hand side of the diagram. This 
framework not only informs on the current sate of the economy but also on its dynamics 
through these changes; this is the meaning of the arrows at both the right and left end of the 
chart. 
 














Having such an analytic tool that integrates the key elements of assets, production, and 
policy can help guide policy and prioritize across alternative interventions. Consider some 
simple examples. If as a result of additional aid inflows a country reallocates spending 
towards providing public services to achieve the MDGs, this will clearly have implications 
for other public services and for the rest of the economy. Shifting domestic resources 
toward the social sectors will impact on available resources in the private sector or in the 
public sector for infrastructure investment, administration, or for operations and 
maintenance of public assets. Likewise, public hiring of skilled labour to fill critical 
vacancies in social sectors, leads to reducing labour from other activities, including the 
private sector, and will raise real wages and possibly lower private growth and income 
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Some of these issues are very difficult to address in empirical work, while others can be 
approximated to generate insights into the main policy challenges. To understand these 
issues more concretely and clarify their relevance, the previous general framework must be 
made capable of taking country-specific context and constraints into account. The next 
section briefly sets out a modelling framework to examine MDG country targets.  
4  A model for simulating MDG-oriented policies and measuring absorptive 
capacity  
MAMS (for ‘Maquette for MDG Simulation’) is a model built along the preceding lines 
with a focus on the capacity constraints and tradeoffs to achieve the MDGs. MAMS is a 
dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, the main originality of which is to 
incorporate a module that covers those MDGs most amenable to economic modelling: 
poverty, health, education, and water-sanitation. Unlike many other CGE models, MAMS 
thus relies on a thorough representation of the allocation and the outcome of public 
spending. As noted in the Introduction, the rationale for the use of a model of this type is 
that the pursuit of MDG strategies has strong interactions with the whole economy via 
markets for foreign exchange, factors (especially labour), goods and services, with 
feedback effects that may significantly alter the findings of more narrow sectoral analyses. 
For example, the amount of real health or education services that a dollar in aid can 
purchase may change significantly in light of changes in exchange rates, prices and wages 
whereas the latter may significantly affect the rate of growth of the economy and the rate 
of poverty reduction. In addition, existing relationships between different MDGs (for 
example, health and education) may influence the expansion in real services that is 
required—improvements in water and sanitation may reduce the expansion in health 
services that is required to reach health MDGs.  
 
In the application described in the following section, the model is applied to an Ethiopian 
database and solved for the period 2002-15.6 More specifically, building on the recent 
literature and sector studies on health and education outcomes, MAMS considers the 
following MDGs: (MDG1) halving, between 1990 and 2015, the headcount poverty rate; 
(MDG2) achieve universal primary education (100 per cent completion rate by 2015); 
(MDG4) reducing by two-thirds the under-5 mortality rate (U5MR) by 2015; (MDG5) 
reducing by three-fourths the maternal mortality rate; and (MDG7) reduce by half the 
number of people without access to safe water and basic sanitation. The model has 
relatively detailed treatment of government activities related to these MDGs. Government 
consumption, investment and capital stocks are disaggregated by function into three 
education sectors (primary, secondary, tertiary), three health sectors, one sector for water 
                                                 
6 The model is presented in detail in Bourguignon et al. (2004) and Lofgren (2004). Preliminary applications 
to Ethiopia are discussed in Lofgren and Diaz-Bonilla (2005), Bourguinon and Sundberg (2006) and 
Sundberg and Lofgren (2006). More work is presently done in the case of Ethiopia and MAMS is now being 
applied to a variety of countries in Africa and Latin America.   9
and sanitation, public infrastructure, and other government activities. The major 
government revenue sources are taxes (direct and indirect), foreign borrowing, and foreign 
grants. The non-government economy is represented by a single activity. The primary 
factors of production are divided into public capital, private capital, and three types of 
labour (unskilled, skilled, and highly skilled). GDP growth is a function of growth in the 
stocks of labour and capital and productivity growth. The composition and overall growth 
of the labour force depends on the evolution of the education sector whereas capital stock 
growth depends on investments. Productivity growth is also endogenous and is represented 
by the effects of changes in the stock of public capital in infrastructure on private 
production. 
 
The core MDG module specifies how changes in the different MDG indicators are 
determined. It is parameterized on the basis of detailed sector studies on Ethiopia. In the 
module the government has an annual primary education budget covering teacher salaries, 
recurrent operations and maintenance costs, and capital investment (for example, in new 
classrooms). Recurrent expenditures and the capital stock in primary education together 
determine the supply side.7 Demand for primary schooling and student behaviour—the 
population share that enrols in the first grade, graduation shares among the enrolled, and 
the shares of the graduates that choose to continue to the next grade—depend on the 
quality of education (student-teacher and student-capital ratios), income incentives (using 
current wages as a proxy, the expected relative income gain from climbing one step on the 
salary ladder), the U5MR (a proxy for the health status of the school population), 
household consumption per capita, and the level of public infrastructure services—
proxying for roads and ease of access to schools. Supply and demand equilibrate through 
the number of pupils in the educational systems and the quality of education. With fixed 
supply capacity, more demand means more children enrolled in primary and a decline in 
quality, which in turn reduces the excess demand. This specification of sector demand and 
supply also captures lags between educational investment and outcomes, which is one 
strength of the approach. Based on sector studies, the lags between increased enrolments 
and outcomes at different education levels are related to the number of years required for 
completion, and actual completion rates.  
 
The specification of health services draws on a World Bank health sector strategy report 
for Ethiopia. It also relies on a supply-demand framework. Improvement in U5MR and 
maternal mortality rates (MDG4 and MDG5) are determined by the level of health services 
per capita (public and private services), per capita consumption, the population shares with 
access to improved water and sanitation services (MDG7), and infrastructure in general—
for example, the role of rural roads in improving health outcomes with given healthcare 
supply. The package of health services that achieves MDG4 and MDG5 also includes 
                                                 
7 Private supply of education services has not been separately included since this is relatively small in 
Ethiopia, but this could be elaborated for countries where it is important.    10
HIV/AIDS prevention services sufficient to halt its spread (part of MDG6). For water and 
sanitation, the population shares with access to improved services are modelled as 
functions of per capita household consumption and provision of government water and 
sanitation services.  
 
The provision of the additional government services needed to reach the MDGs clearly 
requires additional resources—capital, labour, and intermediate inputs—that become 
unavailable to the rest of the economy. The effects of a programme depend on how it is 
financed—from foreign sources, domestic taxes (which reduce consumption), or domestic 
borrowing (which crowds out private investment). Even with 100 per cent foreign grant 
financing for additional services, which minimizes domestic resource costs, the rest of the 
economy is affected through two main channels—labour markets and relative prices. At 
one point of time, expanding provision of health or education services increases demand 
for teachers and doctors, reducing the number of skilled workers available in other sectors 
and therefore the output in those sectors. Increased school enrolment also reduces the size 
of the overall labour force (since it removes a larger part of the school-age population from 
the labour force), though in the medium run it adds to the share of skilled labour in the 
labour force.  
 
Two forces drive changes in relative commodity prices. First, domestic demands switch 
toward MDG-related government services with impacts on production costs and prices 
throughout the economy. Secondly, increased aid flows lead to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, manifested in increased prices of non-traded relative to traded outputs. 
These manifestations of the Dutch disease can bring about long-lasting changes in the 
structure of production, which is diverted from exports and competition with imports. 
 
The limitations on absorptive capacity are captured through three main channels: The two 
channels just mentioned, through labour market and through changes in the real exchange 
rate (relative price of the domestic good and international prices); a third channel through 
potential infrastructure bottlenecks, particularly in transport and energy. Large investments 
in education services, for example, will tend to reduce further absorptive capacity as skilled 
labour is diverted to education, as the relative price of non-tradeables rises (for example, 
real wages are bid up reflecting the Dutch disease effect), and as infrastructure bottlenecks 
reduce the efficiency of public service delivery. Moreover, the impact will not be limited to 
the education sector but affects costs throughout the economy, including other public 
services and the private sector. Policymakers thus face important tradeoffs: increased 
investment in public service delivery is essential for improved MDG outcomes, but beyond 
some point the unit costs begin to rise, along with indirect costs to other sectors. The 
challenge is to keep costs down while also targeting social outcomes over time. Building 
absorptive capacity is clearly a central element to this process.  
  
There are also important complementarities across spending on different MDGs, in our 
modelling framework represented by cross-elasticities, where progress for one MDG may   11
contribute to progress for other MDGs. For example, progress in the provision of improved 
water and sanitation services has a positive impact on heath outcomes. In addition, in 
education the provision of education services (primary, secondary, and higher) helps to 
expand the skilled workforce needed to both increase productivity of the private sector, and 
work in publicly funded schools and clinics. 
5  Building absorptive capacity to reach the MDGs: an illustration  
The discussion in this section is based on scenarios that have been roughly calibrated to the 
country case of Ethiopia.8 However the results are also of broad relevance to other poor 
countries with limited weak absorptive capacity. The scenarios serve to illustrate some of 
the key aspects of absorptive capacity, and the tradeoffs facing policymakers. The starting 
point for considering capacity constraints to reach the MDGs is to consider a business-as-
usual (‘base’) case, under which Ethiopia continues to receive external assistance at the 
current level and to perform along current trends.9 For most of the MDGs, including 
income poverty, primary school completion, and water and sanitation, Ethiopia is expected 
to fall far short of the MDG targets in this scenario. In contrast, two other cases are shown 
which correspond to first, accelerated investment in core infrastructure considered key to 
improving economic growth (denoted as ‘base-infra’ in the figures that follow), and 
second, additional expenditures to reach each of the five education, health and sanitary 
MDGs being modelled (denoted ‘full MDG’). In each of these cases the additional 
financing is assumed to come from external grants, requirements for which are shown in 
Figure 3. 






























                                                 
8 Presented in Bourguignon et al. (2004). 
9 External grants expand at an annual rate of 1.5 per cent from their 2002 level, while foreign loans remain at 
their 2002 level. Government services and GDP all grow at around a 4 per cent annual rate, similar to the 
long-run growth trend.   12
Ethiopia’s basic infrastructure requirements are separately shown from investments needed 
to reach the five social MDG targets since these investment streams are quite distinct, and 
increasing core infrastructure spending is considered critical to accelerating growth a 
necessary input into the first MDG (income poverty). These investments include the basic 
transport system, expanding power generation and distribution, to link the urban, peri-
urban and rural economies, and investing in large-scale water management and irrigation 
systems to improve agricultural productivity.10 It is assumed that a gestation lag of five 
years is necessary for this expanded infrastructure to generate an increase in the 
productivity of the private sector. This is the reason why the need for external financing 
appearing in Figure 3 for this scenario falls to a level close to the base case after this initial 
period, after adding more than US$10 per capita of external financing.11 
 
The third scenario combines external financing requirements for infrastructure with the 
amounts needed to fulfil the five MDG social services. This is the main scenario that 
illustrates the impact of full external grant financing to achieve both the income poverty 
and reach the social MDGs. The combined external financing requirements, rise to around 
US$60 per capita by the end of the period, or approximately 33 per cent of GDP as 
compared with current aid levels of 16 per cent. This undoubtedly represents a huge 
absolute and relative increase in the development assistance received by Ethiopia.  
 
The results suggest that under a set of specific conditions it is possible to achieve the 
MDGs by 2015. Several key conditions pertain however: a predictable flow of external 
grant financing increasing at a rather fast speed; flexible financing that can be used for 
current or capital expenditure needs; grant financing received is actually ‘absorbed and 
spent’,
12 actual delivery of the services for which expenditures have been provided; and so 
forth. The progress towards select MDGs is shown in Figures 3-5, and reveals the different 
contributions made by these investments in basic infrastructure and direct investment in the 
MDGs. The contribution of investment in basic infrastructure, which helps accelerate the 
growth rate relative to the base case by around 1.5 per cent annually, is very important for 
achieving MDG1—halving the incidence of poverty from its 1990 level of 36 per cent of 
the population (using the national poverty line). Spending on MDG-related sectors also 
helps to increase growth and household consumption levels, mainly by raising the supply 
                                                 
10 Discussed in World Bank (2005). Three priorities identified for growth are: (1) public investment to 
support urban rural linkages; (2) reduce risks to agricultural producers through investing in improved water 
management, social safety nets, and security of land tenure; and (3) improve the investment climate and 
reduce risk facing private agents.   
11 This five-year lag in the effect of infrastructure investment also explains the change in the slopes of most 
curves shown below around 2008-09. 
12 See Aiyar et al. (2006) for a discussion of aid surges and absorption versus switching. Such an immediate 
and complete use of aid flows would not necessarily occur if exogenous macroeconomic shocks were 
introduced in the initial framework.    13
of skilled labour and through employment generated by higher public investment.
13 In the 
full MDG scenario (full-MDG), where both sets of investments are taken together, the 
incidence of extreme poverty is roughly halved from 1990 levels to around 19 per cent.  


































Figure 5: MDG2: net primary school completion rate (%) 
 
 
Completion rates for primary education rise increase from 35 per cent in 2002 to 100 per 
cent by 2015. Likewise, the U5MR and maternal mortality rate also fall to levels that just 
reach the MDG targets. The path along which these targets are achieved is not always 
smooth. The dip seen in the first five years for primary school completion with the base 
and base-infra scenarios reflects the rapid expansion of demand for schooling and 
                                                 
13 An additional factor is through the exchange rate effect of appreciation of the currency helping to increase 
average real purchasing power.  
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enrolment. Without a corresponding increase in the supply of educational services, this 
increase in enrolment contributes to a drop in the quality of schooling and therefore in 
completion rates. This process stops when public expenditures in education catch up with 
demand. Three types of capacity constraints particularly affect aid absorption: 
infrastructure constraints, skilled labour constraints, and macroeconomic constraints. These 
help illustrate the importance of sequentially addressing absorptive capacity over time to 
reach the MDGs. 
5.1 Infrastructure  constraints 
As infrastructure networks are developed (roads, energy, and irrigation, telecoms), 
producers and consumers are better integrated into national and international markets, 
expanding opportunities and capturing network effects that can serve to accelerate growth.  
Investment in infrastructure also reduces the indirect costs of doing business (through 
improving, for example, the reliability of power, transport logistics, or reliable product-to-
market timing) and associated losses that depress firm productivity.14 Capturing these 
gains requires a sufficient level of, and sequencing of, public or private investment in 
infrastructure to reach the threshold where economy-wide network effects can begin to 
support higher productivity. Without such productivity gains, additional aid aimed at 
reaching the MDGs would be less effective since it would buy much less of those domestic 
services needed for the MDGs. This is an argument to give some priority to these 
productivity-enhancing investments even though they may not be directly related to the 
achievement of the MDGs. 
 
Other infrastructure investments are associated with service delivery to reach the MDGs 
rather than enhancing the productivity of the private sector. Investment in schools, clinics 
and training facilities, and water and sanitation facilities is clearly required to meet the 
primary education, health, water, and sanitation MDG targets. Physical facilities need to 
expand in parallel with outlays on personnel and other recurrent expenditures to avoid 
deterioration in the quality of services, declining demand, and failure to reach targeted 
outcomes. 
5.2 Skilled  labour  constraints 
The requirements for accelerating primary school completion rates help to illustrate the 
importance of skilled labour constraints. Between 2002 and 2015 over 100,000 trained 
teachers will need to be brought into Ethiopia’s educational system to achieve the target of 
100 per cent primary school completion and to maintain education quality standards 
necessary to ensure there is demand for education services.15 This requires investment in 
                                                 
14 Recent work by Eiffert et al. (2005) on African economies highlights productivity costs associated with the 
quality of infrastructure services. 
15 This is based on Education for All: Fast Track Initiative standards, which implies moving from the current 
75:1 student-teacher ratio to a targeted level of 40:1.    15
teacher training facilities and expanding the number of higher education graduates to meet 
the requirements for skilled teachers. In the short run skilled labour can be hired from other 
sectors, in particular the private sector, but at the cost of both higher wages, and some loss 
in output as labour exits the private sector. Accelerating this process serves to push up unit 
costs, which is reflected in rising costs in the model as capacity limits are reached.  
 
Figure 6 shows the path of real wages, and hence the pressure on skilled labour, under 
three scenarios: the base case; the full-MDG case examined earlier; and the case with aid 
frontloaded to allow increased hiring of teachers and accelerate achievement of the 
enrolment rates to meet the primary completion target. As more funds are spent on hiring 
skilled labour for education, real wages increase significantly, and unit costs consequently 
rise as available skilled labour is limited, and must be bid away from other sectors. In the 
full-MDG scenario, the private sector loses labour to the public sector and wages for 
skilled labour rise across all sectors initially, before levelling off when the expanded 
schooling system starts producing an increasing number of skilled workers. The loss of 
labour and higher real wages also causes private growth to contract. In the frontloading 
scenario, total grants and MDG-related expenditures are sharply elevated for two years and 
then subside to rates required to reach the MDGs. Real wages spike to almost 25 per cent 
above their initial value in the first two years, sharply raising unit costs of achieving the 
MDGs, and slowing the rate of growth. Investment in teacher training, and other secondary 
and higher education programmes helps expand the supply of skilled labour with a lag, and 
wage pressures hence begin to moderate. By the middle of the projection period the real 
wage path moderates and begins to decline. 
 
The comparison of these two real wage paths shows the importance of the timing of 
investments in teacher training capacity. In Figure 6, it would seem that the front-loading 
scenario leads to a cost of skilled labour larger than with the investment profile implicit in 
the full-MDG scenario when looking at the algebraic sum of the areas between the two 
curves. However, things are different when the gap between the two curves is weighed by 
the number of skilled workers. 
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There are plausible conditions under which the market clearing wage for skilled labour 
suggested by the model may underestimate what would be necessary to generate sufficient 
supply. Skilled labour may be attracted abroad by higher wages, a chronic problem for 
many developing countries, new graduates may not be of sufficient quality, or there may 
not be adequate incentives for skilled workers to relocate to remote areas of the country. 
Under these circumstances skilled wages would have to rise more sharply in order to 
recruit and retain adequate teachers, generating higher unit costs. 
5.3 Macroeconomic  constraints 
A major concern across the scenarios for meeting the MDGs is the impact of scaled-up aid 
flows on domestic demand, relative prices, and the real exchange rate. Aid flows permit a 
much larger trade deficit, but to the extent that they are not spent exclusively on imports 
they place upward pressure on prices in the non-traded sector and on the real exchange 
rate, reducing competitiveness and resources flowing to traded goods and services. These 
issues are well recognized.
16 As stressed in Bevan (2005), the extent to which aid flows are 
associated with the problem of real exchange rate appreciation depends largely on the 
relative impact on demand and supply in the non-tradeables sector.17 The supply response, 
depending on the effects of aid on productivity across sectors, largely determines the depth 
and duration of adverse effects following the surge in aid.  
 
In the case of Ethiopia, all scenarios show exchange rate appreciation, rising real wage 
rates, and a deterioration in the trade balance as imports surge and export performance 
deteriorates. Differences in the level of external financing and the way in which aid is used 
determine the impact on the exchange rate, real wages, and trade performance. Figure 7 
shows the path of real exports through 2015. Dutch disease effects are clearly a serious 
concern in the medium-term with the full-MDG scenario and the surge that it generates in 
aid flows. The aid induced appreciation of the exchange rate and the drop in net exports are 
severe. Exports fall from around 14 per cent of GDP to 8 per cent by 2015, and the real 
exchange rate appreciates by close to 20 per cent. However, the impact on real GDP 
growth, which is essentially driven by factor supplies and infrastructure led productivity 
gains, is quite limited.18 This result is to be contrasted with what happens in the ‘base-
infra’ scenario where the GDP export share is slightly above that observed in the base 
scenario at the end of the period. 
 
                                                 
16 Heller and Gupta (2002a) provide a clear overview of the issues and cite several country studies.  
17 How aid is initially used, whether it is used to finance public investment (is spent) and whether it increases 
net imports (is absorbed), will also have a major short-term impact. It is assumed here that all aid is spent and 
has an impact on net imports, and we ignore these short-term issues.  
18 Things would be different if growth were somewhat related to the share of exports in GDP, as is 
sometimes argued in the literature on growth and trade-openness.   17











Public spending on infrastructure and MDG services differ in their effects on the supply 
side and in their import intensities. Infrastructure spending has a positive but lagged impact 
on productivity, whereas spending on MDG services has only a very modest impact on 
productivity in the short run, but affects supply through adding to the stock of skilled 
labour. Infrastructure spending initially causes some exchange rate appreciation, until 
productivity improvements raise growth GDP, incomes, and demand. The import intensity 
of basic infrastructure in Ethiopia, a country with limited domestic capacity for 
manufacturing inputs, is also high. This helps reduce the impact of infrastructure spending 
on relative prices, and hence reduces the adverse impact on competitiveness.  
 
By contrast, investment in provision of MDG-related social services takes much longer to 
impact on productivity (through a healthier, better educated workforce), and in the near 
term places greater pressure on the real exchange rate. In the case of aid spent on MDG-
related services, and in the absence of higher investment in basic infrastructure, the real 
exchange rate appreciates by about 30 per cent and exports decline to less than half their 
initial share of GDP by 2015. Note that appreciation of the real exchange rate also reduces 
the purchasing power of foreign grants—unit costs rise and it requires larger aid flows to 
reach the MDG targets. This comparison confirms the importance of the sequencing of 
public spending in scenarios of aid scaling up. Reaching the MDGs requires increasing the 
absorptive capacity of the economy, which in turn requires increases in productivity and 
eliminating bottlenecks in factor markets, most notably in the skilled labour market.  
5.4  Overall absorptive capacity constraints 
Linking this back to the earlier discussion about aid effectiveness and absorptive capacity 
(Figure 1), constraints posed by skilled labour supply, macro balances, and infrastructure 
capacity determine the returns to aid as the levels of total aid increase. Figure 8 shows the 
‘returns to aid’, as the amount of aid used towards the MDGs is increased. Returns are 
measured here in 2005 and 2011 for the education sector based on the percentage of 
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investment in education that faces the economy initially (in 2005). As grants are used to 
bring more teachers into the school system and expand education services, primary 
completion rates rise but at a declining rate. The declining rate of return is due to both 
rising costs (higher wage payments to attract skilled labour) and to declining quality levels 
which reduce demand. Schools cannot be built rapidly enough, and teacher-classroom 
ratios decline.  













The top curve in Figure 8 shows the same return to aid profile five years later, when public 
investment in higher education and teacher training is already helping to moderate wages, 
school construction has expanded, and improvements in infrastructure are serving to raise 
productivity and reduce unit costs of services. The returns to aid are higher, meaning that 
aid effectiveness has increased. Also, for any level of aid, it is the case that the slope of the 
return to aid curve has increased, meaning that absorptive capacity has increased.19 
Greater increases in primary school completion rates per additional dollar invested, for 
example, can be attained in 2011 than is the case in 2005.  
5.5 Sequencing  investments 
The preceding has shown the importance of correctly sequencing investments to address 
capacity constraints over time to reduce total costs. The simulation with core infrastructure 
investment underscores this point: a threshold level of core infrastructure must be in place 
before productivity gains can be fully realized. Frontloading investment in infrastructure is 
required to capture these gains early on. Delaying core infrastructure investment and 
                                                 
19 Although this requires further verification and improvement in the precision of the calculations, it would 
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focusing on social services will delay gains in productivity, with implications for the rate 
of overall growth, household incomes and public revenues, as well as for the productivity 
of public service delivery and the effectiveness of aid.  
 
Investment prioritization across MDG service sectors depends on lags in the production 
process and cross-sector externalities. Since skilled labour is developed with a lag, and 
since skilled labour is a critical input to expanding the supply of all the MDG services, this 
argues for early investment in education. Placing priority on the sectoral sequencing of 
public services that generate positive externalities also helps to lower the investment cost 
of other MDGs. Both the access to improved water and education levels are important 
elements of reducing under-five mortality. Hence, investment in developing and 
maintaining potable water supplies, as well as maternal education, should precede or move 
in parallel with other child health related investments. If this sequencing is reversed (that 
is, placing initial priority on non-education related MDGs, followed by investment in 
water, education, and finally basic infrastructure services), it would result in higher total 
costs of meeting the MDGs, or, if resources are constrained, it would lead to a shortfall in 
meeting the MDG targets.  
5.6 Frontloading 
Excessive frontloading of aid, it was argued above, places pressure on real wages, slows 
growth, and raises the overall cost of achieving the MDGs. The discussion of sequencing 
also suggests that inadequate frontloading of some investments, such as infrastructure, can 
impose costs through delaying the potential productivity gains and exploiting externalities. 
At the limit, investing too late in training or infrastructure make reaching the MDGs 
impossible. Taken together this suggests that there is an optimal level of frontloading that 
minimizes costs over time. An intuitive argument suggests that absorptive capacity is the 
main criterion in minimizing this cost. Clearly, if the absorptive capacity of aid is not 
constant over time, the total cost of reaching the MDGs could be lowered by reallocation 
aid from the periods where the absorptive capacity is low to periods where it is high. The 
problem is that such a simple argument, borrowed from elementary optimization theory, 
would work if the returns from aid could be measured by a scalar. In the context of the 
MDGs, where no substitution is allowed across goals, this is clearly not the case. Yet, a 
simple experiment shows that the preceding intuition is correct and that there is something 
like an optimal sequencing of public spending on the MDGs and therefore optimal 
sequencing of aid flows.  
 
To explore the question of optimal frontloading further, Figure 9 shows the present 
discounted value of grants required to reach the MDGs as the share of expenditures 
‘frontloaded’ is varied—with the relative composition of these expenditures across MDGs 
maintained constant. Two five-year periods are considered, varying the share of total   20
outlays between the two periods.
20  The resulting ‘U-curve’ shows how the present value of 
total costs falls as the share frontloaded increases from very low levels, costs are 
minimized at around 20 per cent, and thereafter rise at an accelerating rate as capacity 
constraints become binding—labour costs rise, exchange rate appreciation reduces the 
purchasing value of aid, and congestion costs rise from infrastructure bottlenecks. In the 
extreme, at some point around 70 per cent frontloading, costs become effectively infinite 
and reaching the MDGs is not possible.  











It is important to be cautious in interpreting this result, however. First, while it suggests 
that total costs are minimized at around 20 per cent of outlays taking place in the first half 
of the period, it is important to stress that the calculation has not taken into account the 
welfare outcomes along the different paths towards reaching the MDGs. As more 
resources are frontloaded, social service outcomes improve earlier,  and social welfare 
consequently improves. The MDG focus leads to ignoring variations in social welfare 
along the path towards the MDGs. Second, the underlying exchange rate and wage 
dynamics differ along the curve, with consequences for competitiveness of traded goods 
and for wage differentials, the effects of which may appear after the MDG horizon. 
Consideration of scaling up and frontloading aid clearly needs to consider the impact on 
welfare and the consequences for growth and MDG outcomes post-2015. 
5.7  Governance and institutional reforms 
The model does not address the critical question of how underlying institutional capacity 
and governance can be improved. The broad range of issues that this encompasses are 
frequently part of Poverty Reduction Strategies and tackled in policy-based lending by 
institutions like the World Bank—improving public expenditure management, 
                                                 
20 Because the model has been parameterized around 2002, the actual simulation periods correspond to 
2003-09, and 2009-15.  
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strengthening oversight mechanisms, strengthening the business climate, and so on. Taken 
together, governance and institutional reforms can be thought of as measures to improve 
the efficiency of public resource utilization. In terms of the model, they affect the 
underlying productivity of public activities and reduce unit costs of achieving the MDGs—
falling teacher absenteeism, reduced waiting times for processing legal cases, licensing, 
and regulatory issues, less leakage in the use of central government resources for delivery 
of services to end-users. Simple reforms can sometimes have major consequences.21 
 
Consider the effect of introducing governance and institutional reforms in the form of 
improvement in the underlying efficiency of public services at the rate of two per cent 
compounded annually, and independent of the rate of public investment (this assumption is 
used in the World Bank, for example, to guide annual budget parameters). Introducing this 
to the model and recalculating the U-curve in Figure 10 suggests several effects that 
emerge from this. First, the productivity gain in public services significantly reduces the 
cost of achieving the MDGs along all points of the curve and ‘flattens’ the curve, reducing 
the total variation in costs. The total cost of achieving the MDGs by 2015 in present value 
terms falls by around one-third. 














Second, the new point of cost minimization leans slightly towards greater frontloading 
contrary to the expectation that it would shift towards the left (less frontloading as 
productivity levels are higher and unit costs are lower during the second period). The 
ambiguity in this outcome arises from two underlying effects that push in opposite 
directions. Increasing future productivity of public spending pushes toward more 
frontloading in order to benefit from productivity gains longer. On the other hand, there is 
                                                 
21 For an in depth discussion of governance, institutional capacity, and service delivery, see World Bank 
(2003). One example often cited is the Ugandan newspaper campaign to boost schools’ and parents’ ability to 
monitor local officials’ handling of school grants. Through greater public awareness, ‘capture’ or leakage of 
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a change in relative prices between periods. The decline in the cost of investment over time 
pushes towards delaying public investment. In the present case, the first effect seems to be 
stronger than the second. One important implication of this analysis is that anticipated 
incremental gains in underlying governance or productivity should not be a reason to delay 
public expenditures towards capacity building and service delivery. Even if there are 
underlying efficiency gains that reduce costs over time, this does not constitute a reason to 
delay investment in the MDGs, but rather suggests that future gains in absorptive capacity 
due to increasing productivity in public services must be capitalized on by investing early. 
6 Conclusions 
The capacity of low-income counties to absorb and effectively use large aid flows in 
support of the MDGs is a central concern in the debate over international financing of 
MDG efforts. Direct estimates of the financing necessary to achieve the MDGs imply very 
large increases in aid flows at the level of the individual recipient countries. A basic 
question being asked is over the absorptive capacity of low-income countries as higher 
levels of aid will become available to advance the MDG agenda. 
 
We have shown in this paper that absorptive capacity should not be seen as a rigid 
characteristic of recipient countries that would depend only on the quality of its 
governance institutions. In a strict economic sense, absorptive capacity, defined as the 
marginal return to aid, is a dynamic concept that depends on the timing and sequencing of 
public spending. Rapid scaling up of aid in a country with very limited capacity to train 
and hire skilled labour, build new infrastructure, manage new and large-scale public 
programmes, or maintain macro stability may lead to bottlenecks, rising unit costs, and 
falling quality of service delivery. Taken to extremes it could also lead to impaired growth 
potential with adverse medium-term consequences. In such a country, mobilizing 
international aid in support of the MDGs should therefore move in tandem with efforts to 
identify a suitable time profile of aid flows in recipient countries which balances the need 
to quickly accelerate progress towards achieving the MDG outcomes through expanded 
and improved public service delivery, with constraints on absorptive capacity and the way 
to progressively weaken these constraints.  
 
This has implications for the sectoral composition and sequencing of public spending and 
aid disbursements for meeting the MDGs. Country specific plans are required to identify 
key constraints, identify bottlenecks to growth, clarify potential externalities, and formulate 
strategic plans to build capacity. This requires in-depth and country-specific analysis to 
determine the appropriate sequencing of public investment for each country. To provide 
some empirical basis to address these questions the paper employs a modelling approach 
(MAMS) that combines a relatively standard and highly aggregated CGE model with an 
MDG module that links MDG performance to the functioning of social sectors and the 
way different public services (in health, education, water, sanitation and public 
infrastructure) are provided. The model has been applied to Ethiopia to help illustrate the   23
main messages. It focuses on three main constraints to aid absorption—skilled labour, 
infrastructure, and macroeconomic constraints.  
 
Four main conclusions can be drawn from the simulations undertaken with this model: 
•  First, careful sequencing of public investment is important for minimizing the total 
cost of reaching the MDGs. From the outset priority investment is needed in basic 
infrastructure to generate the basis for higher productivity growth and network 
effects improving linkages across and within regions and sectors. Among the MDG 
services, accelerating education spending is a priority since skilled labour can only 
be produced with a lag and is restricting absorptive capacity.  
•  Second, the macroeconomic impact of large aid flows on the tradeables sector (the 
Dutch disease) can be serious, resulting in a significant decline in the share of 
exports in the economy, at least in the short run. The threat to future growth will 
depend in large measure on the supply response in the economy, and the impact of 
aid and development strategies in spurring accelerated productivity growth in both 
the traded and non-traded sectors. 
•  Third, large-scale frontloading of aid disbursements (other than infrastructure) is 
costly as it pushes against absorptive capacity constraints, intensifies the premium on 
skilled wages, bids labour away from the private sector (depressing growth), and 
augments short-term Dutch disease effects. In the case of Ethiopia the model 
suggests that the cost minimizing MDG strategy involves a steep upward profile of 
public spending and aid disbursements. It is not clear however how much this result 
is country specific. 
•  Fourth, improvements in the underlying governance and institutional structures help 
to secure broad productivity improvements in public service delivery, and should 
underpin development strategies. Their cumulative effect can significantly reduce 
overall costs of achieving the MDGs and secure long-term productivity gains. 
However, it is not necessarily because very much progress is anticipated in the future 
that aid should be delayed. It might be optimal to increase early public investment 
precisely to take full advantage of the ongoing and future gains in public sector 
productivity. 
 
Two last remarks should help draw some lessons from the preceding exercise for the 
allocation and the management of aid. First, the paper focused on the allocation of the aid 
directed towards a specific country across sectors and over time. It did not tackle the issue 
of the allocation of aid across countries. Of course, this is where the notion of comparative 
aid effectiveness introduced in Figure 1 should play a role. After taking into account 
country specificity in aggregating returns from aid across countries, an optimal allocation 
clearly tends to equalize marginal returns, or ‘absorptive capacities’ across countries. If not 
enough aid is available, absorptive capacities will not be equalized and some countries will 
not receive adequate aid. The argument in this paper suggests that such reasoning might be 
incorrect if applied in a static way. Absorptive capacity is a dynamic concept and the   24
optimal allocation of aid should be based on both perceived absorptive capacity today but 
also anticipated capacities in the future as defined by an explicit MDG strategy. Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers could be playing this role nowadays.  
 
Second, the argument in this paper is based on framework with no uncertainty, where 
donors have perfect knowledge of the MDG strategy of recipient countries and recipient 
countries reveal their true strategy based on the anticipation of fully certain future aid 
flows. Clearly, the optimal strategy of recipient countries depends very much on the 
confidence they have that donors will hold on their commitments. Likewise, the 
commitment of the donors depends on the confidence they have that recipient countries 
will hold on the strategy they have announced. Such a situation may lead to some low-
equilibrium of the type found in the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma, with none of the 
players trusting their partner. The argument in this paper corresponds to the high 
equilibrium but leaves aside the issue of how donors and recipients can coordinate on that 
equilibrium, which is today the core of the international debate on aid effectiveness.  
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